The Covid-19 Pandemic and the Bounds of Grief by Richardson, Louise et al.
 1 
The Covid-19 Pandemic and the Bounds of Grief1 
 
Louise Richardson, Matthew Ratcliffe, Becky Millar, Eleanor Byrne 
  
Abstract 
This article addresses the question of whether certain experiences that originate in 
causes other than bereavement are properly termed ‘grief’. To do so, we focus on 
widespread experiences of grief that have been reported during the Covid-19 pandemic. 
We consider two potential objections to a more permissive use of the term: (i) grief is, 
by definition, a response to a death; (ii) grief is subject to certain norms that apply only 
to the case of bereavement. Having shown that these objections are unconvincing, we 
sketch a positive case for a conception of grief that is not specific to bereavement, by 
noting some features that grief following bereavement shares with other experiences of 
loss.  
Article 
 
Anyone who loses a loved one will experience grief. At the time of writing—four months 
into the Covid-19 pandemic—grief is receiving much more attention than it ordinarily 
would. This is unsurprising: where there is more death, so there is more grief. But talk of 
‘grief’ during this pandemic is not restricted to the context of bereavement. In many 
countries, restrictions have been imposed in an attempt to reduce the spread of the 
virus. For example, schools, universities, non-essential shops, and cultural venues have 
been closed for many weeks, and people confined to their homes. These restrictions 
have been linked to grief in two distinct ways. 
  
First of all, lockdown restrictions have disrupted end-of-life and funerary customs. Many 
of those who have lost loved ones to Covid-19, or to other causes during the pandemic, 
have been unable to be at the bedside of their loved one: to hold their hand and say 
goodbye, or to resolve differences. Funerals have been prohibited, or restrictions placed 
on their size and form. The same goes for other rituals such as wakes or sitting shiva. 
These changes to customs and rituals plausibly impact upon how grief is experienced.2 
For instance, funerary rituals may help to preserve a sense of connection with deceased 
loved ones, and may also help one to acknowledge the reality of the loss. Thus, we 
might expect those bereaved during the pandemic to struggle more than usual to 
comprehend and adjust to the loss of a loved one. Furthermore, distressing ‘unfinished 
                                               
1 Our work on this article was supported by the AHRC (Grant Ref. AH/T000066/1). 
2 This has been discussed in a number of news articles, for example McCallum and Ridley 2020. 
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business’ with the dead—more likely when we cannot say goodbye—might lead to 
unusually prolonged or complicated grief, sometimes requiring medical attention.3 
 
Second, many of those who are fortunate enough not to have lost someone have still 
experienced varying degrees of emotional upheaval. It has been suggested that some 
such experiences also involve grief. For example, on March 23rd 2020, journalist Scott 
Berinato wrote a much-shared article in the Harvard Business Review entitled ‘That 
Discomfort You’re Feeling is Grief’. An interview with grief expert David Kessler, the 
article describes how, in a radically changed world, ‘we’re feeling a number of different 
griefs’ over, for example, ‘the loss of normalcy; the fear of economic toll; the loss of 
connection’. Furthermore, some of this alleged grief was (or is) anticipatory, involving 
envisioning future losses such as a bereavement or a grim economic future.  
  
On the same day, psychoanalyst Lori Gottlieb, writing in the New York Times, described 
how the ‘smaller losses’ of coronavirus had the power to affect our emotional health 
along with the larger ones: 
  
missed graduations and proms, cancelled sports seasons and performances, 
postponed weddings and vacations, separation from family and friends when we 
need them most. We have also lost the predictability that we take for granted in 
daily life: that there will be eggs and toilet paper on supermarket shelves, that we 
can safely touch a door knob with our bare hands, that we can get a haircut and 
our teeth cleaned or spend a Saturday afternoon at the movies.  
  
As the pandemic has progressed other losses have come to the forefront, especially 
losses of jobs and livelihoods. One might dismiss the claim that those who have not 
been personally bereaved during the crisis really are experiencing grief or maintain that 
the term grief is being used in at least two quite different ways. After all, we sometimes 
use ‘grief’ in an extended or metaphorical way (e.g., ‘she’s really causing me grief!’), 
and one might worry that labelling too many emotional responses to loss as ‘grief’ 
serves only to obscure the distinctiveness of a deeply troubling, life-changing 
phenomenon. However, we will argue that such concerns are misplaced. In sections 1 
and 2, we will consider two potential objections to a permissive conception of ‘grief’: that 
it would involve a revisionary use of the term and that grief is subject to norms that are 
specific to bereavement. Having shown these concerns to be misplaced, we outline 
some features that wider experiences of loss have in common with experiences of 
bereavement. On this basis, we will conclude that there is sufficient support for a use of 
the term ‘grief’ that is both wide-ranging but still succeeds in identifying a unitary 
phenomenon. 
                                               
3 Klingspon et al. 2015. 
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1. The object of grief 
 
What allows us to distinguish one emotion from another? Many philosophers argue that 
the answer lies in what the emotions are about. There are two senses in which an 
emotion might be about something, which philosophers talk about in terms of an 
emotion’s formal and concrete objects. Consider fear. Plausibly, all fear concerns 
danger, and so danger is said to be fear’s formal object, even though experiences of 
fear can have any number of concrete objects, from hungry tigers to dentist’s 
appointments. Similarly, anger is plausibly always about offence, while its concrete 
objects, such as acts of rudeness by others, are more specific. Differing formal objects 
are what distinguish one type of emotion form another. For instance, fear and anger 
differ by virtue of being about danger and offence, respectively. The formal object also 
determines how, when we have an emotion, the concrete object is experienced. For 
example, if we fear the tiger, we experience it as dangerous. If we are angry with our 
neighbour, we experience them as having offended us.  
 
What, then, are the formal and concrete objects of grief? Grief differs from emotions 
such as fear and anger in various ways. For one, it does not take the form of a short-
lived episode: it can last for weeks and months, changing over time. Nevertheless, it 
may have a distinctive formal object. While the concrete object of grief may be the death 
of a particular person, its formal object—one might suggest—is loss or there having 
been a loss. However, if grief is specific to the event of a death, its formal object must 
also be more specific. It involves an irrevocable loss and, one might think, an 
irrevocable loss that is personal, in that involves the loss of a person. If that’s the right 
way to think about grief’s formal object then by definition, we cannot experience grief in 
response to other losses. Or, at least, the ‘grief’ that we feel in these other cases cannot 
be the same type of emotional experience as the grief that follows a death. 
 
If we allowed that we could grieve over losses other than deaths then a lack of clarity 
also arises concerning grief’s concrete objects. While a bereavement might seem to 
involve a clear-cut loss of a particular person, non-death losses during the pandemic 
are often difficult to pin down. Consider, for example, an 18-year-old in the early days of 
lockdown. They suffer some quite concrete losses: particular opportunities for 
socialising, a weekend job perhaps, and the exams they were expecting to sit. But they 
may also undergo, and thus experience an emotional response to, more diffuse losses. 
They may have lost a relatively clear sense of how their future would unfold, for 
example.  
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There is a precedent for considering losses other than deaths as concrete objects of 
grief, thus also suggesting that the formal object of grief is more plausibly ‘loss’ than any 
more specific form of loss. As Gottlieb notes in her article, the category of ‘ambiguous 
grief’ makes space for non-death and difficult-to-pin-down losses. An ambiguous loss 
could be, for example, the loss of a child given up for adoption or a parent with 
Alzheimer’s Disease. These losses are not deaths, but they are in some sense losses of 
particular people.  
 
Other recognised ambiguous losses do not even share this feature with ‘standard’ grief: 
for example, infertility might count as an ambiguous loss. With infertility, the loss is not 
of a particular person but of, potentially, several things, including the possibility of 
occupying a certain role, or of having a certain kind of life that one had imagined for 
oneself. Ecological grief—grief over climate-related losses—is also not grief over a 
person and, especially in its anticipatory form, is likely also to be ambiguous. (Cunsolo 
and Ellis 2018, p. 278). We might also understand the experience of chronic illness in 
terms of ambiguous loss. Living with chronic illness can involve a range of disruptions to 
one’s identity, such as a sense of independence, closeness with others and an 
anticipated fulfilling future. This too does not involve the death of a person, but instead 
involves a range of difficult-to-pin-down losses. Thus, the category of ambiguous grief 
seems to help alleviate the worry about determining the concrete object of non-death 
losses. Perhaps some cases of grief simply do not have a single and clear concrete 
object.  
 
Furthermore, even in the case of grief following a death, it may be an over-simplification 
to say that what is lost is the person who has died, and thus to insist that grief in the 
case of bereavement is about the death (the concrete object) or about irrevocable 
personal loss (the formal object). Michael Cholbi takes ‘the relationship with the 
deceased as it was’ to be grief’s concrete object (2019, p. 497). Bereavement, he 
thinks, involves a kind of ‘loss’ but one that may be better described as a forced change 
to one’s relationship with the deceased. If he’s right, grief might occur not only in cases 
where the loss is hard to pin down, but also where ‘loss’ doesn’t seem quite the right 
description to use. Grief might also relate to certain kinds of change and transition. 
 
Hence there are philosophical positions concerning the object of grief that make grief 
outside of bereavement intelligible. The fact that losses associated with the Covid-19 
pandemic aren’t just deaths need not be an obstacle to their being grieved over and 
neither does the fact that ‘losses’ are not always specific or easily identifiable. 
 
2. Grief’s norms 
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Another potential reason for doubting that we grieve over non-death losses and 
changes relates to social norms - unwritten rules of behaviour. Mersault, the main 
character of Camus’ The Outsider (or The Stranger) does not experience grief over the 
death of his Mother. We feel, when we read the book, that he is wrong not to: that he 
ought to grieve. According to philosopher Robert Solomon, this reflects the fact that 
grief is, in some sense, morally obligatory (Solomon, p. 78). We might resist calling 
emotional responses to other losses and transitions ‘grief’ (at least in the same sense of 
the term), because such responses don’t seem to be subject to these social norms. 
They are not obligatory in the same way. If someone is not especially sad about losing 
their job, or about the cancellation of their school prom or their favourite team’s football 
matches, we do not eye them with the suspicion—or pity—that we direct towards 
Mersault. In fact, we might admire their fortitude and be glad for them. This, one might 
argue, highlights an important difference between grief and other kinds of emotional 
experience. 
 
However, the distinction is not quite so straightforward. Suppose, for now, that a certain 
norm applies specifically to grieving over the death of a person (or perhaps to deaths 
more generally), and that other losses and transitions are not subject to this same norm. 
It may be that the norm attaches to certain kinds of concrete objects of grief, rather than 
to grief itself. That is, perhaps it is not grief that is subject to social norms of obligation. 
Rather, norms concern our responses to the loss of particular people, with whom we are 
in certain relationships. The same seems to be true of other emotional responses. Take 
pride for example. We might look askance at someone who felt no pride in their child’s 
or their spouse’s achievements, thinking that people ought to take pride in such things. 
But it wouldn’t follow that pride itself is necessarily subject to such norms. Suppose I 
feel proud of (for example) my tidy bookshelves or my ability to cook. If I didn’t, I 
suspect you wouldn’t think that I ought to feel proud of these things. But it doesn’t follow 
that what I do feel doesn’t count as pride. Grief and associated behaviours are like that 
too: obligatory when it comes to some things, but otherwise, not. 
 
Even taking grief to be obligatory for certain kinds of bereavements and other losses 
would oversimplify the norms surrounding grief. Whether we feel someone ought to 
grieve is sensitive to the details of their personal circumstances. We do not invariably 
think that grief over the loss of a close relative is obligatory, and we do not always 
admire stoicism in the face of other losses. One might withdraw from the claim that 
someone ought to feel grief over the loss of a family member when one learns more 
about the nature of their relationship. If that relationship was abusive or distant, for 
example, one may feel less inclined to condemn or pity an apparently ‘unfeeling’ 
response. Moreover, it is not difficult to imagine situations in which we would be 
shocked by stoicism in circumstances other than bereavement. For example, if 
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someone wasn’t upset by the loss of an heirloom their grandmother gave them, we 
might consider them unfeeling. Robert Solomon suggests that the kinds of relationship 
with people that result in obligations to grieve are those in which the other person plays 
some role in one’s personal identity. He allows that the loss of ‘treasured objects’ can 
also be a cause of grief, but only when the object likewise plays a role in ‘defining one’s 
self’ (p. 82). If we know that an object is treasured in this way, then we would be at least 
very surprised by a stoical response to its loss.  
 
In summary, the social norms surrounding grief do not entail that grief can only be felt 
over bereavement. The circumstances in which we might say that someone ought to 
grieve are too varied for that. 
 
3. Trivialising grief? 
 
A third and final worry about the conception of grief adopted by Berinato and Gottlieb is 
that it’s just too expansive. This worry is partly theoretical, but also, partly, practical. 
Theoretically speaking, if we call too many emotional responses ‘grief’ we are in danger 
of losing sight of an important category or kind. More practically speaking, if we call too 
many emotional responses ‘grief’ we are in danger of causing offence: grief can be 
deeply painful, and can utterly change the course of a life. To compare such an 
experience with how we feel when an exam is cancelled, might, with justification, cause 
upset, seeming to trivialise the experience. In this third section we address this worry, 
by suggesting that there are several commonalities between experiences of personal 
grief and wider experiences of loss, indicating that the term ‘grief’ can be applied in a 
way that is both expensive and unitary, serving to identify a distinctive kind of 
experience.  
 
So far, we have not tried to offer a definitive account of what does count as grief. In fact, 
we do not expect to find a straightforward and all-encompassing definition of grief, not 
least because the experience of grief varies greatly across individuals, circumstances 
and cultures. Nevertheless, there are important features that many experiences of grief 
do share, beyond its objects and its associated social norms. We can address worries 
about trivialising grief by pointing out that some important characteristic features of grief 
following bereavement are shared by our emotional responses to non-death losses and 
transitions, including those experienced during the pandemic. This demonstrates that a 
more expansive conception of grief does not lead to a kind of ‘anything goes’ liberality.  
 
As well as having characteristic objects and being subject to certain norms, there are 
characteristic ways that grief feels. Most obviously, we wouldn’t count feelings of 
joyfulness in response to a loss as grief. But the experience of grief is not merely one of 
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prolonged sadness with a certain cause. For example, grief following bereavement 
typically involves a period of ‘sinking in’, during which the bereaved person might 
simultaneously know, but not believe or accept, that the person has died. There are a 
number of ways to understand this phenomenon. It may be due to the fact that grief, as 
Colin Parkes (1988) puts it, involves major revision to one’s ‘assumptive world’: on’e 
system of core assumptions about how the world is. When a loved one dies, very 
deeply-held beliefs and ways of thinking and behaving are challenged, and these 
thoughts and behaviours might be slow and difficult to revise. For example, one might 
continue to think about what to make their deceased loved one for dinner or save them 
their favourite spot on the sofa. For a long time, a bereaved person’s ‘habits of thoughts 
and behaviour’ let them down, and the world in general may seem ‘unfamiliar’ (p. 57).  
 
The Covid-19 pandemic may have likewise disrupted some people’s ‘assumptive 
worlds’. It may have challenged deeply-held assumptions about the world’s safety or 
one’s unassailable freedom to see family and friends, for example. If so, we can expect 
for subjects to have experienced a similar sense of unfamiliarity and disbelief as we see 
in grief.   
 
Another common feature of grief following bereavement is disruption to the experience 
of time. Denise Riley describes her experience with great vividness: 
…a sudden death, for the one left behind, does such violence to the experienced 
’flow’ of time that it stops, and then slowly wells up into a large pool. Instead of 
the old line of forward time, now something like a globe holds you. In the 
past…the future lay in front of me as if I could lean into it gently like a finger of 
land, a promontory feeling its way into the sea. But now I’ve no sense of any 
temporal opening, but stay lodged in the present, wandering over some vast 
saucer-like incline of land…His sudden death has dropped like a guillotine blade 
to slice through my old expectation that my days would stream onwards into my 
coming life…this cut through any usual feeling of chronology leaves a great 
blankness ahead (p. 31). 
 
As Riley's account illustrates, grief can involve changes in one's experience of time, 
which can even amount to a feeling of futurelessness: a 'blankness ahead'. Why might 
that be? Again, this may be in part explained in terms of one’s habits of thought and 
action. In some relationships, a person might be integral to one’s assumptions about 
how the future will unfold, both in the short and long term. For example, in the very short 
term, taking for granted that one will go to the supermarket later, involves taking for 
granted that one will do it with them. In the much longer term, when one imagines (for 
example) retirement, it is with that person. As one starts to accommodate the fact that 
they are gone, the future becomes for a while unimaginable, as one slowly rebuilds a 
new assumptive world. As Matthew Ratcliffe puts it, in profound grief, one can have a 
sense of an ‘inchoate, uncertain future that is bereft of possibilities one previously took 
for granted’ (2019, p. 534). 
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A disrupted sense of time was reported so frequently during the pandemic that it 
trended on Twitter, and was discussed, for example, in online news outlets Vox and The 
Independent. Some of the ways in which our experience of time can get thrown off 
course have nothing to do with grief. For instance, in an interview with Vox, Adrian 
Bardon focused on reports that time seemed to those in lockdown to be ‘endless in the 
moment and like it’s flown by in retrospect’. This, he suggested, could be explained by 
‘rumination’: inward-directed attention, known to make time seem to slow, and the fact 
that looking back over periods of locked-down time, one felt as if one had accomplished 
very little. This doesn’t seem to be the same kind of disruption described by Riley. 
However, other kinds of temporal disruption experienced during Covid-19 lockdown 
might be akin to the sense of futurelessness that can arise in grief. Take, again, the 
example of an 18-year-old during the early weeks of lockdown. In the UK and 
elsewhere, schools suddenly closed, exams were cancelled, likewise for the usual end-
of-school celebrations and ceremonies. Unlike the case of bereavement, there is not a 
loss of a single concrete thing around which the their assumptions about the future 
coalesce. But the upshot might be the same: a future that has become unimaginable 
and ‘dark’. 
  
It might be objected that in genuine grief one’s loss or transition is necessarily 
permanent, or at least believed to be permanent. The 18-year-old in our example, 
surely, understands that these changes are temporary. Lockdown will end, school and 
exams will restart, we will all move on again. However, in the early days of lockdown, 
we had little idea how the weeks and months that followed would unfold. Our teenager 
may not have felt confident that they would be able to pick up where they left off. Even 
now, we have been cautioned to expect at best a ‘new normal’. But that aside, some of 
these losses and transitions were permanent. For example, whilst schools and exams 
will continue, the chance to celebrate the last days of the school year was irrevocably 
lost. Likewise, the chance to spend the summer months between school and university 
travelling or socialising normally has gone.  
 
It is ultimately an empirical matter whether the lockdown has truly caused the sense of 
‘futurelessness’ characteristic of profound grief. Nevertheless, there appear to be a 
number of important features that grief following bereavement shares with many 
experiences reported in the context of lockdowns and other measures that have 
disrupted how people live. Hence, there are good-enough grounds for acknowledging a 
conception of grief that encompasses certain non-bereavement experiences, without 
worrying that this conception either conflates importantly different senses of ‘grief’ or is 
too wide-ranging to be informative. This does not rule out an additional use of the term, 
applying more specifically to the experience of bereavement. Nevertheless, we suggest 
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that a wider-ranging use of the term ‘grief’ similarly succeeds in identifying features that 
are common to a range of experiences, rather than a bundle of disparate phenomena. 
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